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OBJECTIVES: Critical care medicine is a natural environment for ma-
chine learning approaches to improve outcomes for critically ill patients as 
admissions to ICUs generate vast amounts of data. However, technical, 
legal, ethical, and privacy concerns have so far limited the critical care 
medicine community from making these data readily available. The Society 
of Critical Care Medicine and the European Society of Intensive Care 
Medicine have identified ICU patient data sharing as one of the priorities 
under their Joint Data Science Collaboration. To encourage ICUs world-
wide to share their patient data responsibly, we now describe the devel-
opment and release of Amsterdam University Medical Centers Database 
(AmsterdamUMCdb), the first freely available critical care database in full 
compliance with privacy laws from both the United States and Europe, as 
an example of the feasibility of sharing complex critical care data.
SETTING: University hospital ICU.
SUBJECTS: Data from ICU patients admitted between 2003 and 2016.
INTERVENTIONS: We used a risk-based deidentification strategy to 
maintain data utility while preserving privacy. In addition, we implemented 
contractual and governance processes, and a communication strategy. 
Patient organizations, supporting hospitals, and experts on ethics and pri-
vacy audited these processes and the database.
MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: AmsterdamUMCdb contains 
approximately 1 billion clinical data points from 23,106 admissions of 20,109 
patients. The privacy audit concluded that reidentification is not reasonably 
likely, and AmsterdamUMCdb can therefore be considered as anonymous 
information, both in the context of the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act and the European General Data Protection Regulation. 
The ethics audit concluded that responsible data sharing imposes minimal 
burden, whereas the potential benefit is tremendous.
CONCLUSIONS: Technical, legal, ethical, and privacy challenges related 
to responsible data sharing can be addressed using a multidisciplinary 
approach. A risk-based deidentification strategy, that complies with both 
U.S. and European privacy regulations, should be the preferred approach 
to releasing ICU patient data. This supports the shared Society of Critical 
Care Medicine and European Society of Intensive Care Medicine vision to 
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improve critical care outcomes through scientific in-
quiry of vast and combined ICU datasets.
KEY WORDS: artificial intelligence; big data; 
database; data anonymization; data science; 
General Data Protection Regulation; Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act; 
machine learning 
The adoption of machine learning is progressing at a revolutionary pace (1), even in the tradi-tionally conservative medical domain (2). The 
promise of creating models that can diagnose, clas-
sify, predict, or optimize treatment using the wealth 
of routinely collected clinical information to indi-
vidualize future treatments is exciting (3). However, 
this requires large amounts of patient data, ideally 
from multiple hospitals. Fortunately, electronic health 
records (EHRs) are widely adopted amongst ICUs (4), 
and ICU admissions generate vast amounts of data 
from patient monitors and life support devices (3).
Broad-scale data sharing with the critical care com-
munity implies that knowledge generation and val-
idation could be accelerated. In addition, it may aid 
in addressing the problem of irreproducibility in re-
search as analyses can easily be replicated, especially 
if code-sharing is enforced (5, 6). However, technical, 
legal, ethical, and privacy concerns have so far pre-
vented large-scale data sharing both in general and by 
the critical care medicine community specifically (7). 
Currently, only two datasets containing comprehen-
sive deidentified data from critical care patients are 
freely and openly accessible, the Medical Information 
Mart for Intensive Care (MIMIC) and eICU databases 
(8–10). However, they contain data collected exclu-
sively in the United States, which limit generalizability 
to other healthcare systems such as those found in 
Europe which are differently organized and resourced. 
Specifically, model and knowledge transferability is 
hampered by substantive differences in ICU case mix, 
treatment strategies, and organization between con-
tinents, thus severely hindering the transition from 
bytes to bedside (11).
Consequently, the Society of Critical Care Medicine 
(SCCM) and the European Society of Intensive Care 
Medicine (ESICM) have identified ICU patient data 
sharing as one of the priorities under their Joint Data 
Science Collaboration (12). With the ultimate goal of 
harmonizing data across different sites and databases, 
they seek to encourage ICUs to make their data avail-
able by providing expert technical, legal, and ethical ad-
vice as well as recommendations on best practices (13). 
In collaboration with Amsterdam University Medical 
Centers (Amsterdam UMC), The Netherlands, known 
for their work in bringing data science to the bedside 
(14, 15), we therefore now report on the development 
and release of Amsterdam University Medical Centers 
database (AmsterdamUMCdb), the first freely acces-
sible comprehensive and high-resolution European 
critical care database. The project is also the first to spe-
cifically address technical, legal, and ethical challenges 
in full compliance with both U.S. and European legis-
lation, including the U.S. Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act as well as the European General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (16, 17). The spe-
cific aim of this article is to describe the steps taken to 
develop AmsterdamUMCdb and to guide ICUs world-
wide to responsibly share their data to benefit future 
critically ill patients.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The department sourcing AmsterdamUMCdb is a 
mixed surgical-medical tertiary referral center for crit-
ical care medicine at an academic medical center in 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, with up to 32 critical care 
beds and up to 12 high-dependency beds. Data from 
multiple clinical information systems were combined 
into the so-called “data lake” (Fig. 1A) (eMethods, 
Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/
CCM/G194). The table structure and underlying data 
model were designed with relevance for critical care, 
utility for machine learning, and human readability in 
mind. Fields that are typically needed together to un-
derstand the content were joined, for example, mea-
surements with both identifiers  and understandable 
names (Data Format, Supplemental Digital Content 2, 
http://links.lww.com/CCM/G195). 
Risk-Based Deidentification Strategy
We used a risk-based iterative deidentification strategy 
to create a dataset that would qualify as anonymous 
data for the purposes of HIPAA and GDPR, maintain-
ing utility while preserving privacy (Fig.  1, B and C) 
(18–20). This approach considers the possibility of 
attacks on the database by linking public or private in-
formation to reidentify patients. To mitigate attacks, we 
Online Clinical Investigations
Critical Care Medicine www.ccmjournal.org     e565
Figure 1. An overview of the process to create AmsterdamUMCdb from different source databases (A). The anonymization threshold separates 
personal data from anonymous data (B). The applied risk-based deidentification strategy demonstrating the iterative nature of performing 
deidentification (C). Final table structure depicting the relations with the admissions table (D). Capitalized words in the tables refer to data types 
used: INTEGER (whole number), SMALINT (small-range integer), BIGINT (large-range integer), FLOAT (floating-point number) or VARCHAR 
(variable size character data). DBs = databases, EHR = electronic health record, GLIMS = General Laboratory Information Management System, 
ID = identifier, LIS = Laboratory Information System, PDMS = Patient Data Management System, PSS = patient scoring system. 
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used different deidentification techniques to generate a 
database that is safe by design (eMethods and eTables 1 
and 2, Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.
com/CCM/G194). In addition, we set up contractual and 
governance processes (21, 22). These processes include 
an end-user license agreement (EULA, Supplemental 
Digital Content 3, http://links.lww.com/CCM/G196) 
that, in contrast to EULA’s from other databases, require 
the signature of a practicing intensivist, the need for end 
users to complete a training on scientific integrity, and 
audits by representatives from patient organizations as 
well as experts on privacy and ethics. In addition, an 
access protocol for source data and an opt out procedure, 
as well as education and delegation logs were installed. 
Our deidentification strategy is subject to a continuous 
quality control cycle. This includes regular assessment of 
reidentification risk, when new data will be added.
Assessment of Reidentification Risk
We assessed reidentification risk using hypothetical 
adversaries representing different attack types. These 
include the “friendly researcher,” who might inad-
vertently reidentify an acquaintance; the “rogue re-
searcher,” who might deliberately reidentify someone 
using public information; and the “rogue insurance 
company,” who might seek, illegally, to reidentify 
someone using corporate data (18, 21).
First, we determined the risk of reidentification 
should AmsterdamUMCdb be completely public, that 
is, without considering contractual and governance 
processes. To this end, we determined which items 
adversaries could have knowledge about the so-called 
“quasi-identifiers.” We applied statistical principles to 
determine reidentification risk of individual patient 
data (23), in particular k-anonymity and l-diversity 
with specific consideration for missing values (24). A 
database is said to have k-anonymity, when individuals, 
selected using quasi-identifiers, cannot be distinguished 
from at least k-1 other individuals in the database. The 
data has l-diversity if there are at least l distinct values 
for a sensitive attribute (e.g., diagnosis) within a group 
of persons with k-anonymity. We determined k-ano-
nymity and l-diversity for all possible combinations of 
“quasi-identifiers” and calculated reidentification risk 
(P
kre id−
= 1) for each group (18, 21, 22).
Second, we determined the likelihood for adversar-
ies to attempt reidentification and their likelihood of 
having access to AmsterdamUMCdb. For the “friendly 
researcher,” we used the Dunbar estimate of average 
number of friends (25), that is, 150, and the preva-
lence of ICU admissions (ρ), that is, 20,109 patients 
in the database divided by 13.7 million adult inhab-
itants in the Netherlands (26), to calculate the likeli-
hood of knowing someone in the database using the 
formula Pacquaintance = − −1 1
150( )ρ . This is a very conser-
vative estimate, especially for researchers outside of 
the Netherlands. The likelihood for both researchers 
of having access to the data is 1. In contrast, for the 
“rogue insurance” company, access to the data requires 
a data breach, which is estimated to occur in up to 27% 
of databases maintained under HIPAA (18). This esti-
mate is reasonable for a conservative risk assessment as 
HIPAA’s deidentification requirements are considered 
less strict than GDPR requirements (27).
Finally, we chose an average risk approach for the 
“friendly researcher” and “rogue insurance company” 
and a maximum risk approach for the “rogue re-
searcher.” The maximum risk approach assumes that 
the “rogue researcher” will attempt to reidentify per-
sons with the highest chance of reidentification (i.e., 
the outliers). However, the “friendly researcher” and 
“rogue insurance company” will only aim to identify 
specific persons, not just anyone, and the risk of a suc-
cessful reidentification attack of a specific person, not 
merely an outlier, is determined by the average risk. 
However, by applying further field and record suppres-
sion, we established at least k-2 anonymity. This con-
servative approach is called “strict average risk” (21). 
We ensured that the final risks of reidentification 
(P P P Pfinal re id access attempt re id− −= × × ) by these adversaries 
did not exceed commonly accepted thresholds (e.g., 
0.05–0.10) (18, 21, 23).
Legal and Ethical Considerations
Our deidentification and governance strategies were 
externally audited by privacy experts to ensure ano-
nymization. To prevent risk of bias, an internal team 
carried out a data privacy impact assessment and an 
external team performed an audit. The external team 
was led by a member of the privacy expert group at 
the Netherlands Federation of UMCs. The Regional 
Medical Ethics Committee confirmed that the creation 
of AmsterdamUMCdb was not eligible for their assess-
ment as no specific research question was involved. 
Online Clinical Investigations
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The Ethics in Intensive Care Medicine group provided 
external ethics review and appraisal.
Communication and Engagements
Since sharing patient data is a sensitive subject, we de-
veloped a media and communication strategy based on 
full disclosure and multiangled views. This included 
a joint press release aiming to reach a large audience 
to assess public perception. In addition, we obtained 
explicit approval from our executive board and in-
volved all stakeholders early on. These included the 
Dutch patient organization IC Connect and the Dutch 
Foundation of Family and Patient Centered Care, 
which both confirmed their perception of added value 
in releasing patient data, when privacy protection has 
been carried out appropriately. The Dutch Society of 
Intensive Care Medicine, and its Research Network, 
also made data sharing a priority. This led to multiple 
representatives of other ICUs expressing their intent to 
share their patient data responsibly.
RESULTS
Version 1.0.2 of AmsterdamUMCdb was released in 
March 2020 as “comma separated values” files. Access 
may be requested from Amsterdam Medical Data 
Science (https:/amsterdammedicaldatascience.nl/). 
Following approval, files can be downloaded from the 
Dutch Data Archiving and Networked Services (https://
doi.org/10.17026/dans-22u-f8vd). Codes used for the 
analyses of this article, as well as detailed descriptions 
of the data, are available online (https://github.com/
AmsterdamUMC/AmsterdamUMCdb). As shown in 
Figure 1D, the data model and table structure com-
bine usability for machine learning with human read-
ability (AmsterdamUMCdb Tables, Supplemental 
Digital Content 2, http://links.lww.com/CCM/G195).
Summary of Available Data
Table 1 shows patient demographics and data character-
istics and Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the diversity of avail-
able data. The database contains approximately 1 billion 
clinical data points related to 23,106 admissions of 20,109 
unique patients between 2003 and 2016. The median 
ICU length of stay was 1.08 days (interquartile range, 
0.83–3.76 d). The released dataset includes patient mon-
itor and life support device data (up to one value every 
minute), laboratory measurements, clinical observations 
and scores, medical procedures and tasks, medication, 
fluid balance, diagnosis groups, and clinical outcomes.
Deidentification and Assessment of 
Reidentification Risk
Compared with the source data, our iterative deiden-
tification strategy resulted in complete deletion of 
265 admissions (1.13%) of 60 patients (0.30%) and sup-
pression of weight, height, and/or diagnosis fields of 
415 patients (1.80%). Table 2 summarizes the assumed 
adversary background knowledge and the formal risk 
analysis. The most prominent risk was presented by the 
“rogue researcher” (Pfinal re id− = .0 05). Compared with 
our risk-based strategy, the HIPAA Safe Harbor method 
would have led to unacceptably high reidentification 
risks (Pfinal re id− = .0 14) (eTable 2, Supplemental Digital 
Content 1, http://links.lww.com/CCM/G194) with the 
potential of reidentification of over half of the patients 
(n = 12,153) in the database by the “rogue researcher.”
Legal Considerations
Legal analyses focused on the GDPR as the data are 
from European patients. Recital 26 states that “the prin-
ciples of data protection should not apply to personal 
data rendered anonymous in such a manner that the 
data subject is not or no longer identifiable. To deter-
mine whether a natural person is identifiable, account 
should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be 
used, considering all objective factors, such as the costs 
of and the amount of time required for identification, 
the available technology at the time of the processing 
and technological developments” (17).
Two independent teams auditing the project re-
ported that “the design, database management and 
governance are state-of-the-art.” Based on our reiden-
tification risk assessment, they concluded that “taking 
into account all means reasonably likely to be used 
for reidentification, reidentification is not reasonably 
likely for AmsterdamUMCdb which can therefore be 
considered as anonymous information in the con-
text of the GDPR.” In addition, Amsterdam UMC is 
NEN7510 (ISO 27001) certified, which ensures that 
strict information governance protocols are in place 
for the protection of source data.
The teams also audited the legal aspects of the data 
processing to develop the database from the source 
data, which arguably “is” subject to the GDPR. 
Article 9 of the GDPR identifies health data as one 
Thoral et al
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TABLE 1. 
Characteristics of Patients and Data in Amsterdam University Medical Centers Database 
(AmsterdamUMCdb)
Characteristics Total ICU
Medium Care Unit 
(High-Dependency 
Unit)
Distinct patients, n 20,109 16,518 4,295
ICU admissions, n 23,106 18,386 4,720
ICU length of stay, d, median (IQR) 1.08 (0.83–3.67) 1.25 (0.92–4.71) 0.83 (0.71–1.62)
Gender
 Male, n (%) 12,799 (63.65) 10,565 (63.96) 2,234 (52.01)
Age, yr, n (%)
 18–39 2,202 (10.95) 1,538 (9.31) 743 (17.30)
 40–49 1,897 (9.43) 1,356 (8.21) 613 (14.27)
 50–59 3,405 (16.93) 2,740 (16.59) 800 (18.63)
 60–69 5,272 (26.22) 4,518 (27.35) 954 (22.21)
 70–79 5,293 (26.32) 4,635 (28.06) 824 (19.19)
 80+ 2,040 (10.14) 1,731 (10.48) 361 (8.41)
Admission year, n (%)
 2003–2009 8,556 (42.55) 7,940 (48.07) 809 (18.84)
 2010–2016 11,553 (57.45) 8,578 (51.93) 3,486 (81.16)
Admission type, n (%)
 Surgical admissions 11,294 (48.88) 8,942 (48.63) 2,352 (49.83)
 Urgent admissions 6,246 (27.03) 4,985 (27.11) 1,261 (26.72)
Reason for admission, n (%)
 Cardiothoracic surgery 5,935 (25.69) 5,759 (31.32) 176 (3.73)
 Sepsis 3,136 (13.57) 2,751 (14.96) 385 (8.16)
 Respiratory failure 1,568 (6.79) 1,402 (7.63) 166 (3.52)
 Neurosurgery 1,619 (7.01) 739 (4.02) 880 (18.64)
 Trauma 902 (3.90) 613 (3.33) 289 (6.12)
 Gastrointestinal surgery 1,149 (4.97) 800 (4.35) 349 (7.39)
 Vascular surgery 1,037 (4.49) 791 (4.30) 246 (5.21)
 Cardiac arrest 959 (4.15) 958 (5.21) 1 (0.02)
 Neurologic disorders (nontraumatic) 628 (2.72) 475 (2.58) 153 (3.24)
 Cardiac disorders (including cardiogenic shock) 538 (2.33) 485 (2.64) 53 (1.12)
(Continued )
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of the special categories of personal data for which 
data processing is prohibited without a specific law-
ful basis. In our case, data processing was performed 
on the lawful basis of scientific research as specified 
in article 89 of the GDPR, since it is not realistically 
feasible to operate on the basis of explicit consent 
given the large numbers of subjects included in the 
database.
Ethical Considerations
From an ethical perspective, medical confidentiality 
precludes sharing of potentially identifiable information 
to others without explicit consent of the patient unless 
overwhelmingly in the public interest. Although obtain-
ing informed consent would clearly allow ethically ac-
ceptable secondary use of health-related data, obtaining 
consent from critical care patients may be extremely 
difficult to achieve in practice (28). This is especially 
the case if large numbers of patients are involved, where 
there is high mortality or where patients may have im-
paired levels of consciousness, all of which are true in the 
ICU. In addition, refusals and untraceable patients will 
reduce data quality and introduce selection bias that may 
lead to biased results and algorithms that can contribute 
to further health disparities. Thus, obtaining individual 
patient informed consent for sharing critical care data-
bases is neither desirable nor feasible. The ethical prin-
ciple “duty of easy rescue” applies here (29). When the 
burden of performing an action is small and the benefit 
is putatively large, we ought to act. For the case of data 
sharing using proper risk-based deidentification strate-
gies, the risk is minimal. But, the benefit for other and 
Supportive therapies, n (%)
 Vasopressors and/or inotropes 13,575 (58.75) 12,809 (69.67) 766 (16.23)
 Mechanical ventilation 16,680 (72.19) 16,305 (88.68) 375 (7.94)a
 Renal replacement therapy 1,140 (4.93) 1,136 (6.18) 4 (0.08)
Outcome, n (%)
 Death at unit discharge 2,288 (9.90) 2,216 (12.05) 72 (1.53)
 Death < 1 yr after discharge 4,730 (20.47) 4,002 (21.77) 728 (15.42)
Severity scores
 Urgent patients
  APACHE II score, median (IQR) 19 (13–26) 21 (16–27) 12 (8–16)
  SOFA score (day 1), median (IQR) 7 (4–10) 8 (5–10) 2 (1–4)
 Elective patients
  APACHE II score, median (IQR) 16 (12–20) 17 (14–21) 11 (8–15)
  SOFA score (day 1), median (IQR) 6 (4–8) 6 (4–8) 2 (1–4)
APACHE = Acute Physiology And Chronic Health Evaluation, IQR = interquartile range, SOFA = Sequential Organ Failure Assessment. 
a Noninvasive ventilation.For conciseness, only major categories of reason for admission are shown. Reasons for admission documented 
without diagnostic codes (i.e., full text only) were excluded from the analysis. APACHE II score ranges from 0 to 71; higher ranges indi-
cate greater severity of illness. SOFA score ranges from 0 to 24; higher ranges indicate greater severity of illness. 
TABLE 1. (Continued). 
Characteristics of Patients and Data in Amsterdam University Medical Centers Database 
(AmsterdamUMCdb)
Characteristics Total ICU
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future generations of patients as well as society is poten-
tially large.
Communication
AmsterdamUMCdb received extensive coverage by in-
ternational media including prime time Dutch television 
news. Overall public sentiment was positive, with only 
a small minority of reactions related to privacy issues. 
Among millions of people reached, only one request for 
data removal was received. This is in line with the results 
of a recent extensive poll among over 7,000 patients by 
the Dutch Patient Federation showing that over 97% of 
patients, asked to share their data, were comfortable with 
data sharing for medical research to help future patients 
(30). Only a very small number of patients (1%) refused 
out of fear of inadequate protection of their data.
DISCUSSION
The SCCM/ESICM Joint Data Science Collaboration 
results from the shared vision of these societies in 
exploring how common data definitions, data science, 
and data sharing may impact clinical care, quality im-
provement, and scientific inquiry in critical care. With 
the ultimate goal of harmonizing data across differ-
ent sites and databases, responsible data sharing is an 
important first step. Wide availability of critical care 
databases is of paramount importance to ensure model 
performance, validity, generalizability, and transfera-
bility. Since AmsterdamUMCdb is already being used 
by over 40 research institutions worldwide to develop 
new (machine learning) models and validate published 
ones, it demonstrates the need for wide availability of 
anonymized medical data.
Figure 2. Overview of the diversity of data in Amsterdam University Medical Centers Database (AmsterdamUMCdb). The plots show a 
selection of the most common data shown as percentage of availability for all admissions: device data that have been automatically  
filed (A), observations and scores that were entered manually (B), laboratory measurements (C), and administered drugs (D).  
ALAT = alanine aminotransferase, APACHE = Acute Physiology and Chronic Health Evaluation, , ASAT = aspartate aminotransferase, 
CO = cardiac output, DNAR = do not attempt resuscitation, PEEP = positive end-expiratory pressure, SDD = selective decontamination 
of the digestive tract, Spo2 = peripheral oxygen saturation, TSH = thyroid-stimulating hormone. 
Online Clinical Investigations
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Figure 3. Example of time series data from an ICU admission in Amsterdam University Medical Centers Database (AmsterdamUMCdb) 
displayed as a graphical timeline. The data are from a patient admitted after cardiopulmonary resuscitation who received mild therapeutic 
hypothermia and developed shock and acute kidney injury with initiation of renal replacement therapy. The series show a selection of data 
documented throughout the admission: vital variables, clinical observations, infusions of medication, fluid input and output, supportive care, and 
inserted catheters, drains, and catheters. Data have been downsampled for readability and translated to English from the original Dutch 
variables and values. ABP = arterial blood pressure, CPAP = continuous positive airway pressure, CPR = cardiopulmonary resuscitation,  
CVVH = continuous veno-venous hemofiltration, I/O = input/output, NSR = normal sinus rhythm, PC = pressure control ventilation,  
PEEP = positive end-expiratory pressure, PS = pressure support ventilation, Spo2 = peripheral oxygen saturation, Svo2 = venous oxygen saturation. 
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The GDPR provides a framework to support 
and regulate the sharing of sensitive data. However, 
member states are free to impose additional local 
statutory requirements and regulations. A similar ex-
ample exists in the United States where the California 
Consumer Privacy Act is generally perceived to be 
more restrictive than HIPAA. Since the risk assess-
ment for proper deidentification is pivotal in our 
approach and not a mere academic exercise, one of 
the challenges will be to gain insight into the potential 
adversaries. The background information that poten-
tial adversaries may possess will differ from country 
to country depending on the health information rou-
tinely exchanged with third parties. Correctly identi-
fying these sources of information that could be used 
to reidentify patients requires consulting clinical lead, 
local hospital administration, or business intelligence 
departments.
TABLE 2. 




Friendly Researcher Rogue Researcher
Rogue Insurance  
Company
Assumed background knowledge
 Gender X X X
 Age X X X
 Weight X X  
 Height X X  
 Admission date X X X
 Survival at discharge X X X
 Number of ICU admissions   X
Assessment of reidentification risk
 P(access) 1.00 1.00 0.27
 P(intention) 0.20 0.10 0.10
 Average risk
  P(reidentification) 0.047 0.047 0.009
  k-anonymity 89 89 682
  l-diversity 26 26 65
 Maximum risk
  P(reidentification) 0.50 0.50 0.50
  k-anonymity 2 2 2
  l-diversity 2 2 2
P final risk 0.01 0.05 0.0002
Strict average risk is used for determining final risk for the “friendly researcher” and the “rogue insurance company,” whereas maximum 
risk was used for the “rogue researcher.” For the “friendly researcher,” P(intention) is acquaintance risk, the risk of knowing somebody in 
the database.
Online Clinical Investigations
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Our risk-based deidentification strategy operation-
alizes the definition of anonymity by using thresholds 
(Fig. 1B). This resonates well with recital 26 of the 
GDPR which calls for consideration of all means rea-
sonably likely to be used for reidentification to deter-
mine whether natural persons are identifiable. However, 
different definitions have also been proposed, focusing 
on the prevention of singling out, linkability, or infer-
ence, even if only of theoretical concern (31). This is a 
problematic position to take for releasing critical care 
databases as these are great examples of extensive time 
series data, given the high resolution of data from moni-
tors and life support devices. All patient records will 
be unique if enough data are released: the “curse of di-
mensionality.” And indeed, some may argue that no 
deidentification strategy is able to guarantee zero risk of 
reidentification and that individual critical care patient 
data could never be released (23, 32). Nevertheless, al-
though many previously released public databases suf-
fered from incorrect deidentification strategies or were 
only deidentified by following HIPAA Safe Harbor 
methods, and thus were not able to withstand reidenti-
fication attacks (33), recent evidence suggests that when 
a dataset is properly deidentified, even when releasing 
redacted narratives, this may only lead to low confidence 
matches even after investing a significant amount of 
time (34). In addition, generating synthetic data from real 
patient data may further reduce reidentification risks, 
and AmsterdamUMCdb has been selected to feature 
in the prestigious Conference on Neural Information 
Processing Systems competition of December 2020 to 
evaluate the feasibility of this technique (35, 36).
A strength of our approach is that it resulted in the 
removal of only a relatively small number of records 
and fields. This should ensure adequate usability for 
data science. However, a significant limitation of our 
strategy is that in an earlier step, all free-text fields and 
imaging have been removed. In addition, the main 
limitation of AmsterdamUMCdb is that it has been 
sourced from a single Dutch ICU, thereby limiting 
generalizability. A further limitation of our risk-based 
strategy is that it does not directly take into account 
the risk of prospective collection, since adding new 
records to a deidentified database may unintentionally 
reveal information (e.g., approximate discharge dates). 
Also, given that access to the data is one of the deter-
minants of reidentification risk, violating the EULA by 
distributing the database to third parties, which cannot 
reasonably be monitored, could increase risk. Finally, 
no risk-based deidentification strategy will fully pre-
vent against malignant intent such as criminal or ter-
rorist activity, since in those cases, adversaries will 
have gained access to additional sensitive resources. 
However, in these rare circumstances, not reidentifi-
cation but disclosure of those other resources should 
most likely be the main concern.
In contrast to other openly accessible ICU databases 
(8–10), our table structure sacrifices disk and memory 
space for the sake of interpretability using denormal-
ization (Data Format, Supplemental Digital Content 2, 
http://links.lww.com/CCM/G195). We believe a simpli-
fied data model will expedite the process from data to 
bedside.
Although many of the challenges for responsible data 
sharing have been addressed, several other problems 
should not be overlooked. First, some investigators 
perceive the data as their property and believe to have 
the exclusive right to publish based on these data (37). 
Second, hospitals may see data as revenue or means 
to attract industry experts, such as Google, although 
this has shown to generate negative publicity (38). 
Third, several EHR vendors, at least in the United 
States, are actively lobbying against data sharing based 
on privacy arguments yet are also actively developing 
revenue streams based on smart analytics (39). Finally, 
hospitals may fear that cases where quality of care was 
arguably suboptimal would be uncovered by competi-
tors, lawyers, or the public.
Although previous efforts by individual critical 
care departments in Belgium and Spain have been 
prevented by local ethics committees (7), there have 
been some notable initiatives by consortia of ICUs to 
promote data sharing. These include the Critical Care 
Health Informatics Collaborative and M@tric initia-
tives, collecting large amounts of data from six U.K. 
and three Belgian ICUs, respectively (40, 41). However, 
their current focus is on sharing data between found-
ing ICUs only.
It could be argued that reliance on big data from 
EHR’s to improve patient outcomes might lead to a 
greater disparity between higher and lower resource 
countries, as the latter often lack implementation of an 
EHR. However, we see an opportunity for using large 
databases from high resource countries to better than 
before determine the added benefit of (costly) medical 
interventions.
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Costs of data governance, including the costs of a 
risk-based approach, were not specifically addressed. 
Although the actual data extraction with iterative 
deidentification including manual checks has been 
estimated to have taken two full time equivalents of 
combined clinical and nonclinical staff for a month, 
the legal and ethical process, by the nature of the sensi-
tivity of releasing healthcare data, required between 9 
and 12 months in our case. We imagine by having cre-
ated a framework for sharing ICU data, future releases 
of AmsterdamUMCdb but more importantly datasets 
from other institutions will require a more reasonable 
timeframe.
As mentioned, currently all freely available critical 
care datasets come from the United States (9, 10, 42). 
This may be partially explained by differences between 
the privacy laws of the United States and Europe. The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule provides two methods by which 
health information can be designated as deidenti-
fied. One method requires expert determination of 
very low risk of reidentification, comparable with our 
approach. The other is arguably easier to adhere to by 
requiring the removal of 18 specific elements (eTable 2, 
Supplemental Digital Content 1, http://links.lww.com/
CCM/G194) and absence of actual knowledge that the 
remaining data are reidentifiable. It may be argued that 
this pathway was not designed for the current digital 
age with the everincreasing availability of public and 
private datasets (27). Our approach to data governance 
complies with both U.S. and European regulations and 
should be considered the model for accretion for fu-
ture deidentified healthcare datasets. However, because 
risk-based deidentification is not without its caveats or 
costs, we expect all major medical societies, including 
SCCM and ESICM, to play an import role in dissemi-
nating the state-of-the-art of responsible disclosure of 
healthcare data.
Connecting ICUs that consider sharing their pa-
tient data is important for creating a worldwide net-
work as well as a knowledge base to address challenges 
related to privacy and ethics. Besides sharing data, 
ICUs should require end users to share their queries 
and code to ensure reproducible research. This would 
greatly contribute to the broader goals of the SCCM/
ESICM Joint Data Science Collaboration that include 
advancing critical care by harmonizing datasets across 
sites and continents to facilitate a common language 
spoken across a global collaborative (12).
CONCLUSIONS
The SCCM/ESICM Joint Data Science Collaboration 
envisions global ICU data sharing and harmonization. 
The development and release of AmsterdamUMCdb 
serves as an example on how to address the many 
technical, legal, ethical, and privacy challenges re-
lated to responsible data sharing using a multidiscipli-
nary approach. A risk-based deidentification strategy, 
that complies with both U.S. and European privacy 
regulations, should be the preferred approach to re-
leasing ICU patient data. To accelerate delivering on 
the promise of data driven approaches, we encourage 
other ICUs to follow this example.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Amsterdam University Medical Centers 
(Amsterdam  UMC) is grateful to the Executive 
Committee and the Data Science Section of the Society 
of Critical Care Medicine and the European Society of 
Intensive Care Medicine for initiating their visionary 
Data Science Collaboration; to our colleagues at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Laboratory for 
Computational Physiology for extensive discussions 
on many aspects related to the creation, deidentifica-
tion and distribution of critical care databases and for 
producing the MIMIC and eICU databases that were 
a great inspiration; to our Privacy Officers Marcel van 
der Haagen and Michel Paardekooper for expert ad-
vice; to our Communications department, in particular 
Nicole de Haan and Jan Hol for help with and execution 
of our communication strategy; and to the Executive 
Board of Amsterdam UMC, in particular Dr. Mark 
Kramer, MD, PhD for strongly supporting this initiative. 
The AmsterdamUMCdb Collaborators consist of the 
authors and Luca F. Roggeveen, MD, Lucas M. Fleuren, 
MD, Tingjie Guo, MSc, Department of Intensive Care 
Medicine, Amsterdam Medical Data Science (AMDS), 
Amsterdam Cardiovascular Sciences (ACS), Amsterdam 
Infection and Immunity Institute (AI&II), Amsterdam 
UMC, Vrije Universiteit, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands; Diederik A. M. P. J. 
Gommers, MD, PhD, Department of Intensive Care 
Medicine, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, The Netherlands 
and Executive Committee, Dutch Society of Intensive 
Care (NVIC), Utrecht, The Netherlands; Lilian C. M. 
Vloet, PhD, Department of Emergency and Critical 
Care, HAN University of Applied Sciences, Nijmegen, 
Online Clinical Investigations
Critical Care Medicine www.ccmjournal.org     e575
The Netherlands and Foundation Family and Patient 
Centered Care, Alkmaar, The Netherlands and IQ 
Healthcare, Radboud Institute of Health Sciences, 
Scientific Center for Quality of Healthcare, Nijmegen, 
the Netherlands; Bas C. T. van Bussel, MD, PhD, Iwan 
C. C. van der Horst, MD, PhD, Department of Intensive 
Care Medicine, Maastricht University Medical Center+, 
Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands; 
Olaf L. Cremer, MD, PhD, Department of Intensive Care 
Medicine, University Medical Center Utrecht, Utrecht 
University, Utrecht, The Netherlands; Sander Rigter, 
MD, Department of Anesthesia, Intensive Care Medicine 
and Pain Medicine, St. Antonius Hospital, Nieuwegein, 
The Netherlands; Tim Frenzel, MD, PhD, J. G. (Hans) 
van der Hoeven, MD, PhD, Department of Intensive 
Care Medicine, Radboudumc Nijmegen, Nijmegen, 
The Netherlands; Rob J. Bosman, MD, Department of 
Intensive Care, OLVG, Amsterdam, The Netherlands; R. 
P. (Peter) Pickkers, MD, PhD, Department of Intensive 
Care Medicine, Radboudumc Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The 
Netherlands and Research Collaboration on Critical Care 
in The Netherlands (RCCNet), Dutch Society of Intensive 
Care Medicine (NVIC), Utrecht, The Netherlands; Leo 
M. A. Heunks, MD, PhD, Department of Intensive Care 
Medicine, Amsterdam Medical Data Science (AMDS), 
Amsterdam Cardiovascular Sciences (ACS), Amsterdam 
Infection and Immunity Institute (AI&II), Amsterdam 
UMC, Vrije Universiteit, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam, The Netherland and Research Collaboration 
on Critical Care in The Netherlands (RCCNet), Dutch 
Society of Intensive Care Medicine (NVIC), Utrecht, The 
Netherlands; Arjen J. C. Slooter, MD, PhD, Department 
of Intensive Care Medicine, University Medical Center 
Utrecht, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands 
and Research Collaboration on Critical Care in The 
Netherlands (RCCNet), Dutch Society of Intensive Care 
Medicine (NVIC), Utrecht, The Netherlands; Nicole P. 
Juffermans, MD, PhD, Department of Intensive Care 
Medicine, Amsterdam Medical Data Science (AMDS), 
Amsterdam Cardiovascular Sciences (ACS), Amsterdam 
Infection and Immunity Institute (AI&II), Amsterdam 
UMC, Vrije Universiteit, Universiteit van Amsterdam, 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands and Department of 
Intensive Care, OLVG, Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
and Research Collaboration on Critical Care in The 
Netherlands (RCCNet), Dutch Society of Intensive Care 
Medicine (NVIC), Utrecht, The Netherlands; Leo A. 
Celi, MD, MS, MPH, Institute for Medical Engineering 
and Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
Cambridge, MA and Division of Pulmonary, Critical 
Care and Sleep Medicine, Beth Israel Deaconess Medical 
Center, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA. The 
SCCM/ESICM Joint Data Science Task Force consists 
of these authors: Matthew Churpek, MD, MPH, PhD, 
Department of Medicine, University of Wisconsin, 
Madison, WI; Gilles Clermont, MD, Department of 
Critical Care Medicine, CRISMA Laboratory, University 
of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA; Ari Ercole, MD, PhD, 
Division of Anaesthesia, University of Cambridge, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom and Data Science Section, 
European Society of Intensive Care Medicine, Brussels, 
Belgium; Paul W. G. Elbers, MD, PhD, Department 
of Intensive Care Medicine, Amsterdam Medical 
Data Science (AMDS), Amsterdam Cardiovascular 
Sciences (ACS), Amsterdam Infection and Immunity 
Institute (AI&II), Amsterdam UMC, Vrije Universiteit, 
Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands and Data Science Section, European Society 
of Intensive Care Medicine, Brussels, Belgium. 
 1 Department of Intensive Care Medicine, Amsterdam 
Medical Data Science (AMDS), Amsterdam Cardiovascular 
Sciences (ACS), Amsterdam Infection and Immunity Institute 
(AI&II), Amsterdam UMC, Vrije Universiteit, Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
 2 Department of Internal Medicine, Erasmus MC, Rotterdam, 
The Netherlands.
 3 Department of Intensive Care Medicine, Erasmus MC, 
Rotterdam, The Netherlands.
 4 Division of Trauma, Surgical Critical Care and Emergency 
Surgery, Perelman School of Medicine, University of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.
 5 Department of Emergency Medicine, Durham VA Medical 
Center, Durham, NC.
 6 Executive Committee, Society of Critical Care Medicine, 
Mount Prospect, IL.
 7 Department of Intensive Care Medicine, University Medical 
Center Utrecht, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands.
 8 Executive Committee, European Society of Intensive Care 
Medicine, Brussels, Belgium.
 9 Department of Anaesthesia and Intensive Care, Humanitas 
Research Hospital, Humanitas University, Milan, Italy.
 10 Department of Medicine, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 
WI.
 11 Department of Critical Care Medicine, CRISMA Laboratory, 
University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA.
Thoral et al
e576     www.ccmjournal.org June 2021 • Volume 49 • Number 6
 12 University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom.
 13 Alan Turing Institute, London, United Kingdom.
 14 Division of Anaesthesia, University of Cambridge, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom.
 15 Data Science Section, European Society of Intensive Care 
Medicine, Brussels, Belgium.
The Regional Medical Ethics Committee deemed that the cre-
ation of Amsterdam University Medical Centers Database 
(AmsterdamUMCdb) was not eligible for their assessment as 
no specific research question was involved. The process of de-
veloping the database was audited by an external team led by a 
member of the privacy expert group at the Netherlands Federation 
of University Medical Centers. The Ethics in Intensive Care 
Medicine group provided external ethics review and appraisal.
Drs. Thoral and Elbers wrote the deidentification process draft 
and drafted the article. Mr. Peppink and Mr. Driessen designed 
the data extraction process. Dr. Sijbrands led the external privacy 
auditing process. Dr. Kompanje lead the ethics review. Dr. Thoral, 
Mr. Peppink, Mr. Driessen, and Dr. Elbers analyzed and inter-
preted the data and performed the iterative deidentification. Drs. 
Kaplan, Bailey, Kesecioglu, Cecconi, Ercole, Churpek, Clermont, 
and Girbes were involved in starting the Society of Critical Care 
Medicine/European Society of Intensive Care Medicine Joint 
Data Science Collaboration, participated in extensive discussions 
related to data deidentification and sharing, and audited these 
processes. Drs. van der Schaar, Ercole, and Elbers evaluated ma-
chine learning applicability. All authors read, commented on, and 
approved the final article.
Supplemental digital content is available for this article. Direct 
URL citations appear in the printed text and are provided in the 
HTML and PDF versions of this article on the journal’s website 
(http://journals.lww.com/ccmjournal).
Dr. Sijbrands’ institution received funding from European Institute 
of Innovation and Technology (EIT) Health and Amgen. Drs. 
Kaplan and Bailey received funding from Society of Critical Care 
Medicine. Dr. Cecconi received funding from Directed Systems, 
Edwards Lifesciences, and Cheetah Medical. Dr. Churpek’s in-
stitution received funding from an EarlySense research grant; 
he is supported by National Institutes of Health (NIH) R01 
(GM123193), and he has a patent pending for risk stratification 
algorithm for hospitalized patients (money from royalties from the 
University of Chicago). Dr. Clermont received funding from the 
NIH, Department of Defense, National Science Foundation, and 
NOMA AI. The remaining authors have disclosed that they do not 
have any potential conflicts of interest.
For information regarding this article, E-mail: p.thoral@amsterda-
mumc.nl
REFERENCES
 1. Rajkomar A, Dean J, Kohane I: Machine learning in medicine. 
N Engl J Med 2019; 380:1347–1358
 2. Beam AL, Kohane IS: Big data and machine learning in health 
care. JAMA 2018; 319:1317–1318
 3. Bailly S, Meyfroidt G, Timsit J-F: What’s new in ICU in 2050: 
Big data and machine learning. Intensive Care Med 2017; 
44:1524–1527
 4. Cosgriff CV, Celi LA, Stone DJ: Critical care, critical data. 
Biomed Eng Comput Biol 2019; 10:1-7
 5. Stupple A, Singerman D, Celi LA: The reproducibility crisis in 
the age of digital medicine. npj Digit Med 2019; 2:2
 6. Bruns SB, Ioannidis JPA: p-curve and p-hacking in observa-
tional research. PLoS One 2016; 11:e0149144
 7. McLennan S, Shaw D, Celi LA: The challenge of local consent 
requirements for global critical care databases. Intensive Care 
Med 2019; 45:246–248
 8. Mark R: The story of MIMIC. In: Secondary Analysis of 
Electronic Health Records. MIT Critical Data (Eds). Cham, CH, 
Springer, 2016. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK543630/. Accessed September 22, 2020
 9. Johnson AE, Pollard TJ, Shen L, et al: MIMIC-III, a freely ac-
cessible critical care database. Sci Data 2016; 3:160035
 10. Pollard TJ, Johnson AEW, Raffa JD, et al: The eICU collabo-
rative research database, a freely available multi-center data-
base for critical care research. Sci Data 2018; 5:180178
 11. Anesi GL, Admon AJ, Halpern SD, et al: Understanding ir-
responsible use of intensive care unit resources in the USA. 
Lancet Respir Med 2019; 7:605–612
 12. Kaplan LJ, Cecconi M, Bailey H, et al: Imagine…(a common 
language for ICU data inquiry and analysis). Crit Care Med 
2020; 48:273–275
 13. European Society of Intensive Care Medicine - Data Science 
Section: Data Science – ESICM. Available at: https://www.
esicm.org/groups/data-science/. Accessed January 20, 2020
 14. Roggeveen LF, Fleuren LM, Guo T, et al: Right dose right now: 
Bedside data-driven personalized antibiotic dosing in severe 
sepsis and septic shock - rationale and design of a multicenter 
randomized controlled superiority trial. Trials 2019; 20:745
 15. Elbers PW, Girbes A, Malbrain ML, et al: Right dose, right now: 
Using big data to optimize antibiotic dosing in the critically ill. 
Anaesthesiol Intensive Ther 2015; 47:457–463
 16. govinfo: Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(1996). Public Law 104–191. Available at: https://www.
govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-104publ191. Accessed 
September 22, 2020
 17. EUR-Lex: General Data Protection Regulation (2016). 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679. Available at: https://eur-lex.eu-
ropa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj. Accessed September 22, 
2020
 18. El Emam K: Guide to the De-Identification of Personal 
Health Information. Boca Raton, Auerbach Publications, 
2013. Available at: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/
books/9780429100659. Accessed September 22, 2020
 19. Arbuckle L, Ritchie F: The five safes of risk-based anonymiza-
tion. IEEE Secur Priv 2019; 17:84–89
Online Clinical Investigations
Critical Care Medicine www.ccmjournal.org     e577
 20. Prasser F, Kohlmayer F, Kuhn KA: The importance of context: 
Risk-based de-identification of biomedical data. Methods Inf 
Med 2016; 55:347–355
 21. El Emam K, Arbuckle L: Anonymizing Health Data: Case 
Studies and Methods to Get You Started. Sebastopol, O’Reilly 
Media, Inc., 2013
 22. El Emam K, Rodgers S, Malin B, et al: Anonymising and shar-
ing individual patient data. BMJ 2015; 350:h1139–h1139
 23. Brandt M, Franconi L, Guerke C, et al: Guidelines for the 
Checking of Output Based on Microdata Research. ESSNet 
SD, 2010. Available at: https://research.cbs.nl/casc/ESSnet/
guidelines_on_outputchecking.pdf. Accessed February 16, 
2020
 24. Ciglic M, Eder J, Koncilia C: k-Anonymity of microdata with 
NULL values. In: Database and Expert Systems Applications. 
Decker H, Lhotská L, Link S, et al (Eds). DEXA 2014. Lecture 
Notes in Computer Science. Springer Verlag, 2014, pp 
328–342
 25. Gonçalves B, Perra N, Vespignani A: Modeling users’ activity 
on twitter networks: Validation of Dunbar’s number. PLoS One 
2011; 6:e22656
 26. Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (CBS): CBS statline. 
Available at: https://opendata.cbs.nl/statline/#/CBS/nl/. 
Accessed January 20, 2020
 27. Cohen IG, Mello MM: Big data, big tech, and protecting patient 
privacy. J Am Med Assoc 2019; 322:1141–1142
 28. Mentzelopoulos SD, Slowther AM, Fritz Z, et al: Ethical chal-
lenges in resuscitation. Intensive Care Med 2018; 44:703–716
 29. Porsdam Mann S, Savulescu J, Sahakian BJ: Facilitating the 
ethical use of health data for the benefit of society: Electronic 
health records, consent and the duty of easy rescue. Philos 
Trans A Math Phys Eng Sci 2016; 374:20160130
 30. Patiëntenfederatie Nederland: Delen medische data voor meeste 
patiënten geen punt | Nieuws, 2019. Available at: https://www.
patientenfederatie.nl/nieuws/delen-medische-data-voor-meeste-
patienten-geen-punt. Accessed December 27, 2019
 31. El Emam K, Alvarez C: A critical appraisal of the Article 29 
Working Party Opinion 05/2014 on data anonymization tech-
niques. Int Data Priv Law 2015; 5:73–87 
 32. Rocher L, Hendrickx JM, de Montjoye YA: Estimating the suc-
cess of re-identifications in incomplete datasets using gener-
ative models. Nat Commun 2019; 10:3069
 33. El Emam K, Jonker E, Arbuckle L, et al: A systematic review 
of re-identification attacks on health data. PLoS One 2011; 
6:e28071
 34. Branson J, Good N, Chen JW, et al: Evaluating the re-identifica-
tion risk of a clinical study report anonymized under EMA policy 
0070 and health canada regulations. Trials 2020; 21:200
 35. Foraker R, Mann DL, Payne PRO: Are synthetic data deriva-
tives the future of translational medicine? JACC Basic Transl 
Sci 2018; 3:716–718
 36. Jordon J, Jarrett D, Yoon J, et al: Hide-and-seek privacy chal-
lenge. arXiv 2020; arXiv 2007.12087
 37. Figueiredo AS: Data sharing: Convert challenges into opportu-
nities. Front Public Health 2017; 5:327
 38. Wachter RM, Cassel CK: Sharing health care data with dig-
ital giants: Overcoming obstacles and reaping benefits while 
protecting patients. JAMA 2020; 323:507–508
 39. Farr C: Epic and About 60 Hospitals Sign Letter Opposing 
HHS Proposed Data Rules. 2020. Available at: https://www.
cnbc.com/2020/02/05/epic-about-60-hospitals-sign-letter-
opposing-hhs-proposed-data-rules.html. Accessed February 
23, 2020
 40. Harris S, Shi S, Brealey D, et al: Critical Care Health Informatics 
Collaborative (CCHIC): Data, tools and methods for reproduc-
ible research: A multi-centre UK intensive care database. Int J 
Med Inform 2018; 112:82–89
 41. M@tric Project: M@tric, 2019. Available at: https://www.mat-
ric.be/. Accessed December 22, 2019
 42. Shillan D, Sterne JAC, Champneys A, et al: Use of machine 
learning to analyse routinely collected intensive care unit data: 
A systematic review. Crit Care 2019; 23:284
